Trump’s ‘Immployment’ Law Agenda: Intensifying Employment-Based Enforcement and Un-authorizing the Authorized by Griffith, Kati L & Gleeson, Shannon
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
Fall 2019 
Trump’s ‘Immployment’ Law Agenda: Intensifying Employment-
Based Enforcement and Un-authorizing the Authorized 
Kati L. Griffith 
Cornell University, kategriffith@cornell.edu 
Shannon Gleeson 
Cornell University, smg338@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Labor 
Relations Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Trump’s ‘Immployment’ Law Agenda: Intensifying Employment-Based 
Enforcement and Un-authorizing the Authorized 
Abstract 
This article considers President Trump’s immigration efforts through an immployment law lens. 
Immployment is a conceptual frame that reminds us to consider (1) immigration policy’s impacts on 
employers and the employment-based rights of workers, and (2) employment and labor law’s impacts on 
immigration policy. It draws from available enforcement data to argue that Trump’s regime is intensifying 
the use of workplace-based immigration enforcement tools such as audits of employer records and 
arrests of workers at their place of work. While his predecessors used these tools too, Trump is 
simultaneously pursuing both high profile worker arrests and bureaucratic audits as key tools of a more 
aggressive immigration enforcement strategy. The Trump administration is also deviating from his 
predecessors by un-authorizing large groups of authorized workers. The article focuses its attention 
primarily on one such targeted group, workers with Temporary Protected Status (TPS), who may soon 
lose their authorization. It also uses interviews with two dozen immigrant worker advocates in the New 
York City metropolitan area to convey the ways that the threat of workplace-based immigration 
enforcement and unauthorization efforts are consequential for workers and the government compliance 
and benefits regimes that rely on voluntary participation of immigrant workers. 
Keywords 
immigration, legal status, policy, enforcement, Temporary Protected Status, TPS 
Disciplines 
Immigration Law | Labor and Employment Law | Labor Relations 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
© Southwestern Law School. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
Suggested Citation 
Griffith, K. L., & Gleeson, S. (2019). Trump’s ‘immployment’ law agenda: Intensifying employment-based 
enforcement and un-authorizing the authorized [Electronic version]. Southwestern Law Review, 48(2), 
475-501. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1331 
  
   
  
 
  
 
      
     
      
     
        
       
    
   
       
      
    
       
     
    
          
      
 
                
             
             
           
    
              
           
          
            
         
              
          
               
 
TRUMP’S ‘IMMPLOYMENT’ LAW
AGENDA: INTENSIFYING EMPLOYMENT-
BASED ENFORCEMENT AND 
UN-AUTHORIZING THE AUTHORIZED
Kati L. Griffith and Shannon Gleeson*
This article considers President Trump’s immigration efforts through an 
immployment law lens. Immployment is a conceptual frame that reminds us 
to consider (1) immigration policy’s impacts on employers and the
employment-based rights of workers, and (2) employment and labor law’s
impacts on immigration policy. It draws from available enforcement data to
argue that Trump’s regime is intensifying the use of workplace-based 
immigration enforcement tools such as audits of employer records and
arrests of workers at their place of work. While his predecessors used these
tools too, Trump is simultaneously pursuing both high profile worker arrests 
and bureaucratic audits as key tools of a more aggressive immigration 
enforcement strategy. The Trump administration is also deviating from his
predecessors by un-authorizing large groups of authorized workers. The 
article focuses its attention primarily on one such targeted group, workers
with Temporary Protected Status (TPS), who may soon lose their
authorization. It also uses interviews with two dozen immigrant worker 
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476 SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
advocates in the New York City metropolitan area to convey the ways that 
the threat of workplace-based immigration enforcement and un-
authorization efforts are consequential for workers and the government
compliance and benefits regimes that rely on voluntary participation of
immigrant workers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2017, the Trump administration announced, “the largest 
payment ever levied [against an employer] in an immigration case.”1 In this 
extraordinary case, a court ordered Asplundh Tree, a tree trimming 
government contractor, to pay $95 million.2 A year later, in August 2018,
300 federal immigration enforcement agents, some arriving in helicopters,
descended on a large trailer manufacturing facility in Northern Texas.3 They
arrested 160 unauthorized immigrants at their place of work.4 Both of these
cases illustrate immigration enforcement actions that take place in, and 
impact, the employment sphere. They are part of President Trump’s self-
1. Asplundh Tree Experts, Co. Pays Largest Civil Settlement Agreement Ever Levied by ICE, 
ICE NEWSROOM (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/asplundh-tree-experts-co-
pays-largest-civil-settlement-agreement-ever-levied-ice.
2. Id.
3. Mark Smith & Jason Whitely, Immigration Agents Raid Texas Business, Detain 160
Undocumented Workers in Surprise Raid, USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/08/29/ice-agents-detain-160-
undocumented-workers-texas-raid/1133735002/.
4. Id.
     
      
      
   
 
         
    
     
     
    
     
         
    
    
    
     
        
   
          
              
        
      
     
      
       
 
            
    
        
    
             
    
 
          
            
 
               
            
           
              
             
               
           
            
     
 
   
4772019] TRUMP'S ' IMMPLOYMENT' LAW AGENDA
described “war” on immigrants and immigration.5 Beyond the arrests,
prosecutions, and fines are the devastated immigrant families and
communities coping with the detention and deportation of many of these 
unauthorized workers.
The spectacle of worksite immigration raids has garnered renewed
attention during the Trump administration. Nonetheless, the legal 
foundations on which workplace-based immigration enforcement actions rest
are in no way new. Federal law has intertwined the immigration and 
employment spheres since 1986, when Congress introduced the workplace 
as a key site of immigration enforcement.6 Since then the workplace has
been an on again, off again, target of audits and surprise raids as employers
are legally required to verify workers’ immigration authorization.7 The
previous two presidential administrations prior to Trump pursued workplace-
based immigration enforcement, though in very different ways. President
Bush (2001-2008) was known for initiating high-profile workplace raids and 
worker arrests,8 while President Obama (2009-2016) was known for shifting 
the enforcement pressure to employers, rather than workers.9 
While it borrows from the Bush and Obama administrations, President
Trump’s brand of enforcement in the workplace is unique. It is new in the
sense that the Trump administration is using every tool in the workplace-
based immigration enforcement toolkit. His administration is pursuing both
audits and arrests simultaneously. The Trump administration is also adding 
its own aggressive expansion, one that we did not witness in prior 
administrations and one that has implications for the workplace and beyond.
5. Scott Bixby, Trump’s Midterm Pitch in Arizona: Immigration is ‘Like a War’ on America, 
DAILY BEAST (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-declares-war-on-
immigration-in-fiery-arizona-rally; Masha Gessen, Trump’s New War on Immigrants, THE NEW
YORKER (Aug, 10, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/trumps-new-war-on-
immigrants; Melissa Gira Grant, Trump Has Turned the War on Trafficking Into a War on
Immigrants, RADIO BILINGUE (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-declares-war-
on-immigration-in-fiery-arizona-rally.
6. Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement versus Employment Law Enforcement: The 
Case for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303, 305 
(2010).
7. Scholars have consistently argued for the need to consider worker rights and immigration
regulation together. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Borders of Collective
Representation: Comparing the Rights of Undocumented Workers to Organize Under United States 
and International Labor Standards, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 431, 432 (2009); Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost
Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and
Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 740, 741 (2003); Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After
Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 1459 (2008); Saucedo, supra note 6.
8. Laura D. Francis, ICE Work-Site Enforcement Likely to Borrow from Obama, Bush, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.bna.com/ice-worksite-enforcement-
n57982088343/.
9. Id.
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It has further restricted legal immigration, such as refugee flows, and has 
reduced access to protections from deportation. It has engaged in a broad
program to un-authorize individuals who are currently authorized to live and 
work in the U.S. For example, the Trump administration has tried to
effectively eliminate new applications to the Deferred Action to Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) program. It has announced the end to a longstanding
humanitarian deportation relief program, the Temporary Protected Status 
(TPS) program, by removing countries from the list of beneficiaries one by
one.10 Ending TPS would un-authorize this group of temporarily authorized 
immigrants overnight. This would render them immediately deportable
(through workplace-based immigration enforcement or otherwise) and 
subject to termination from their current employment.11 
In this Article, we consider the Trump administration’s efforts through
an immployment law lens.12 Immployment is a conceptual frame that reminds 
us to consider (1) immigration policy’s impacts on employers and the 
employment-based rights of workers, and (2) employment and labor law’s
impacts on immigration policy. For example, as the authors have posed
elsewhere immigration law, and employers’ role in enforcing it, poses
institutional barriers for workers attempting to file claims against their 
employers.13 This is the case even when they face egregious violations of
wage and/or workplace health and safety requirements.14 In this way, we use 
the term as an “interpretive device[]”–a sensitizing idea–that opens up areas 
of inquiry.15 Immployment law has normative law and policy implications, 
as it signals potential impacts that go beyond the immediate policy regime.
10. Zachary Mueller, Trump Administration’s Latest Workplace Raid Takes 133 Workers in
Nebraska Area, AMERICA’S VOICE (Aug. 15, 2018), https://americasvoice.org/blog/nebraska-raid/.
11. Dara Lind, Judge Blocks Trump’s Efforts to End Temporary Protected Status for 300,000
Immigrants, VOX (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/4/17935926/
tps-injunction-chen-news.
12. Immigration policy has increasingly pervaded employer-employee relations, and hence 
immigrant worker experience, on multiple fronts. See Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment”
Law: The Constitutionality of Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 389, 431 (2011); Kati L. Griffith, Undocumented Workers: Crossing the Borders of
Immigration and Workplace Law, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 611, 630, 631 (2012).
13. SHANNON GLEESON, PRECARIOUS CLAIMS: THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF WORKPLACE
PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 133–36 (2016); Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The
Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker Claims Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561,
569 (2010); Kati L. Griffith & Shannon Gleeson, The Precarity of Temporality: How Law Inhibits
Immigrant Worker Claims, 39 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 111, 119-20 (2017).
14. Id.
15. This is consistent with social researchers who use similar conceptual frames as starting
points for qualitative research studies. See Maartje A. H. van der Woude, et al., The Negotiated
Expansion of Immigrant Control: Crimmigration in the Netherlands, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 560,
561 n.2 (2014) (citing multiple social researchers along these lines).
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This usage is analogous to how law and society scholars employ the term 
crimmigration to encourage scholars to interrogate the interaction between 
criminal law and immigration law more fully.16  Crimmigration scholars 
denote the increasingly penal nature of immigration policy regimes 
internationally, but also identify “[c]rime-[b]ased [r]elief” from deportation 
such as visas for those who assist in the enforcement of criminal law.17 
In Part II we compare the Trump administration’s workplace-based 
enforcement actions to those of his two immediate predecessors and raise 
questions about the potential impact of these efforts on employers, workers, 
and communities.  Trump’s presidency is still underway, but the data 
provided in Part II suggest that both worker arrests and targeted enforcement 
actions against employers are cornerstones of Trump’s regime.   Trump’s 
agenda deviates from his predecessors in that it aggressively targets 
unauthorized immigrant workers through worksite arrests (unlike Obama’s 
agenda, but similar to Bush’s agenda) at the same time it aggressively pushes 
for employer compliance (unlike Bush’s agenda, but similar to Obama’s 
agenda). 
In Part III, we demonstrate another element of Trump’s immigration 
agenda that deviates from his predecessors and has implications for the 
employment sphere.  It aims to “de-authorize” large swaths of workers who 
have various forms of temporary protection from deportation and work 
authorization.  We specifically consider Trump’s impact on workers with 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS)–a group that is slated to lose its temporary 
authorization to work in the U.S.  Our in-depth interviews with two dozen 
TPS advocates and experts, mostly based in New York City, also reveal 
negative impacts for workers and their ability to access benefits regimes on 
which they rely.  The interviews illustrated considerable worker distress 
about losing work authorization or becoming unauthorized.  These workers 
live and work under the intense fear of being picked up by the Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency at their places of employment, or as 
they walk the streets at any time. Advocates report that workers are fearful 
of any and all interactions with public spaces and government actors, even 
those actors who are trying to assist them in enforcing their rights and 
benefits as workers.  Thus, Trump’s immigration policies confuse and 
intimidate even those workers who are currently authorized to live and work 
 
 16. See generally CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW (2015); 
KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2004); 
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. UNI. 
L. REV. 367 (2006). 
 17. Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Beyond Severity: A New View of Crimmigration, 22 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 664, 682-83 (2018); Leticia M. Saucedo, A New ‘U’: Organizing Victims and 
Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 891, 892 (2008). 
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in the U.S.  In Part IV we conclude by raising research questions that could 
further untangle the effects of Trump’s old-but-new immigration agenda in 
the employment sphere.18 
II. TARGETING UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION AT THE WORKPLACE 
Even though the Trump administration is using the same workplace-
based enforcement tools we have seen in the past, its strategy combines the 
strategies of previous administrations to simultaneously pursue unauthorized 
worker arrests at the worksite and exert various forms of pressure on 
employers through investigations and audits.  The 1986 Immigration Reform 
and Control Act, referenced in the Introduction, requires that employers 
verify their employees’ work authorization.  It provides the federal 
government with the discretion to initiate worksite raids, investigations and 
employer audits in order to ensure that employers comply.  A survey of news 
coverage and available data on enforcement actions illustrates that the Trump 
administration has chosen to use all available tools to engage in workplace-
based immigration enforcement. 
A. Workplace Raids and Arrests 
Arrests of unauthorized workers at their places of employment are a key 
tactic of President Trump’s administration both rhetorically, and in practice.  
Raids are worksite enforcement initiatives that result in detentions or arrests 
of immigrant workers.  Sometimes ICE detains a manager, or employer 
representative.  In fiscal year 2018, the government indicted 72 managers and 
convicted 49 managers of criminal violations of immigration law.19  
 
 18. Even though federal policy is dominant, state legislatures have also combined the 
immigration and employment spheres.  As seen with Arizona’s high-profile SB1070 “show me your 
papers” bill, local governments often try to deter unauthorized immigration by making it harder for 
employers to hire this workforce and by making these jobs less tolerable for unauthorized workers. 
See Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 586 (2012) (referencing 
Arizona’s SB 1070) (“SB 1070 . . .  [is often] referred to by critics as Arizona’s ‘racial profiling’ 
law and ‘show me your papers’ statute”).  See also Leticia Saucedo, States of Desire: How 
Immigration Law Allows States to Attract Desired Immigrants, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473, 477 
(2018).  In contrast, the California legislature has instituted a number of laws that protect the rights 
of California’s immigrants from the federal government’s aggressive immigration enforcement 
measures at the workplace. See Kati L. Griffith, The Power of a Presumption: California as a 
Laboratory for Unauthorized Immigrant Workers’ Rights, 50 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1279, 1295–1303 
(2017). See also Daniel Costa, California Leads the Way: A Look at California’s Laws that Help 
Protect Labor Standards for Unauthorized Immigrant Workers, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE 
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/california-immigrant-labor-laws/ (describing 
California’s protection). 
 19. ICE Worksite Enforcement Investigations in FY18 Surge, ICE NEWSROOM (Dec. 11, 
2018), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-worksite-enforcement-investigations-fy18-surge. 
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Nonetheless, the bulk of arrests stemming out of worksite raids are arrests of 
workers.20 
Trump’s ICE has revived Bush-era worksite raids and worker arrest 
tactics.  The Obama administration avoided this practice, instead focusing 
enforcement efforts on employers.  Accordingly, in Trump’s first full fiscal 
year (October 2017-September 2018), the government charged 666 workers 
and 113 managers with criminal violations.21  Beyond criminal proceedings, 
ICE also made administrative arrests, which are arrests that relate to charges 
of removability/deportability from the United States.  All 1,525 
administrative worksite-related arrests during this period were worker 
arrests.  Criminal and administrative arrests stemmed from voluntary audits 
employers participate in as part of ICE’s mandatory and voluntary audits,  
and ICE’s other investigatory initiatives.22 Each of these enforcement 
mechanisms long preceded the Trump administration.  Even the Social 
Security Administration’s recent announcement–that it will heighten scrutiny 
of wage and tax statements and will notify employers about discrepancies–is 
a renewal of a much-criticized Bush-era practice that advocates challenged 
and the government halted for a time.23 
It is too early to tell whether worker arrests will reach the heights seen 
during the Bush administration,24 but the Trump administration has signaled 
 
 20. Andorra Bruno, Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement: Performance Measures, 
CONG. RES. SERV., 5 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R40002.pdf (“It seems reasonable to 
assume that most individuals arrested on administrative charges are non-managerial employees. 
Criminal arrests include arrests for illegal hiring as well as for identity theft, alien harboring, money 
laundering, and other criminal violations. Citizens and noncitizens alike can be the subject of 
criminal arrests, as can non-managerial employees, managerial employees, and employers”).  See 
also Alan Gomez, Feds Targeting More Worksites Crack Down on Undocumented Workers–But 
Not Their Employers, USA TODAY (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
2018/12/11/donald-trump-targeted-more-worksites-undocumented-immigrants-immigration-and-
customs-enforcement/2263656002/. 
 21. Gomez, supra note 20. 
 22. Alex Ebert, ICE Arrests 146 Ohio Workers at Unionized Meat-Packing Plant, BNA DAILY 
LAB. REP. (June 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/6RFC-96ND (“ICE said the raid was part of a yearlong 
investigation based on evidence Fresh Mark provided voluntarily to the federal government through 
the IMAGE program”). 
 23. Massoud Hayoun, The Social Security Administration Has a New Plan to Flag 
Undocumented Workers to Employers, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://psmag.com/economics/the-social-security-administration-has-a-new-plan-to-flag-
undocumented-workers-to-employers (“Previous administrations have sent out such letters before, 
but were ‘temporarily halted during litigation and congressional inquiry because it was wrongfully 
used as a method of immigration enforcement that was found to hurt workers and employers 
alike’”). 
 24. For information on Bush raids, see Lessons Learned: Mississippi and Iowa, CLINIC LEGAL 
(Nov. 12, 2008), https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/RAIDS%20Mississippi%20and%20Iowa 
%20Lessons%20Learned.pdf; Comprehensive Documentation of Immigration Enforcement 
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that it intends to double down on enforcement efforts.25  It has hired the 
personnel it thinks will help it achieve these goals.  As Figure 1 
demonstrates,26 the Bush administration extensively used workplace raids.  
In the last two years of Bush’s presidency, ICE averaged 5,600 arrests per 
year. In contrast, the average annual arrest rate flowing from worksite 
investigations in the final two years of the Obama administration was just 
over 400 individuals.  The Agriprocessors raid, by far the most noteworthy 
workplace raid, occurred more than ten years ago under the Bush 
administration in May of 2008.  ICE arrested four hundred workers, and some 
managers, at a meatpacking plant in Postville Iowa in a highly publicized and 
criticized worksite raid.27 At least initially, the Trump administration’s 
worksite raid levels have landed somewhere in between the Bush and Obama 
administrations.  During Trump’s first full fiscal year (October 2017-
September 2018) ICE arrested a total of 2,304 individuals as part of worksite 
enforcement.28 
 
Operations, CENT. LEGAL (Oct. 7, 2008), https://tunkas2009.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/
comprehensive_raid_list.pdf. 
 25. ICE Work-Site Enforcement Likely to Borrow from Obama, Bush, supra note 8. 
 26. ICE Worksite Enforcement Investigations in FY18 Surge, supra note 19 (describing points 
for arrests and audits in 2018 used in figure 1); ICE Work-Site Enforcement Likely to Borrow from 
Obama, Bush, supra note 8 (describing data points for arrests from 2007-2017, audits from 2009-
2017, used in figure 1); Toby McIntosh & Amber McKinney, ICE Data Show Immigration Audits 
Up, Penalties Increased Five-Fold in FY 2010, BLOOMBERG LAW (Sept. 17, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/YV5S-G6Z2 (providing data points for audits in 2007 and 2008 in figure 1). 
 27. See, e.g., Luis Argueta, AbUSed: The Postville Raid, NEW DAY FILMS (2012), 
https://www.newday.com/film/abused-postville-raid. 
 28. Anna Giaritelli, ICE Arrests of Illegal Workers, Employers Up 700 Percent in 2018, 
WASH. EXAMINER, (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/ice-arrests-of-
illegal-workers-employers-up-700-percent-in-2018. 
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ICE seems poised, however, to reach Bush-level arrests in the remaining 
years of the Trump presidency.  Figure 1 illustrates that arrests are sharply 
on the rise.  During the Fall of 2017, an ICE official called for a 400 percent 
increase in worksite investigations.29  Our survey of news reports during 2018 
shows that there has been a highly publicized worksite raid almost every 
month.30  Indeed, in December 2018 ICE touted the success of several “high-
profile enforcement actions” which resulted in hundreds of worker arrests.31 
These spectacles grab public attention and spur concern among immigrant 
and worker communities.  For example, in January 2018, ICE targeted 7-
 
 29. Id. 
 30. There were raids in 2017 too.  See, e.g., David Bacon, Fire and ICE: The Return of 
Workplace Immigration Raids, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 27, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/fire-and-
ice-return-workplace-immigration-raids (reporting on 55 worker detentions in Mississippi); Jack 
Weatherly, 11 Held in ICE Restaurant Raids Plead Guilty, MISS. BUS. J. (Aug. 17, 2017), 
http://msbusiness.com/2017/08/11-held-ice-restaurant-raids-plead-guilty/; Sarah Fowler, Feds 
Won’t Say Where 55 Miss. Migrants Have Been Taken, USA TODAY (Feb. 24, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/02/24/restaurant-immigration-
raids/98360024/; Jenny Jarvie, More than 50 Detained in Immigration Raids at Asian Restaurants 
in Mississippi, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-mississippi-
immigration-raids-20170223-story.html. 
 31. ICE Worksite Enforcement Investigations in FY18 Surge, supra note 19. 
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Eleven stores across the country in workplace raids.  The media reported 
extensively on these investigations and raids, which targeted locations such 
as ninety-eight 7-Eleven stores across the country.32 
Similar to the Bush years, some Trump worksite raids are larger scale 
and focused on a range of industries in a variety of locations.  In February 
2018, ICE detained 232 workers in a raid of businesses in California’s San 
Francisco Bay Area,33 and more than 200 workers from 122 businesses in the 
Los Angeles area.34  In April 2018, ICE detained close to a hundred workers 
at a meatpacking plant in Tennessee.35 In June 2018, ICE arrested over a 
hundred workers at an Ohio gardening company.36  In August 2018, ICE 
arrested 133 workers from farms, a restaurant, a grocery store, and other 
businesses in and around a small town in Nebraska.37  Yet, some of these 
 
 32. James Doubek, ICE Targets 7-Eleven Stores In Nationwide Immigration Raids, NPR (Jan. 
11, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/11/577271488/ice-targets-7-eleven-
stores-in-nationwide-immigration-raids; Corky Siemazko, Immigration Agents Raid 7-Eleven 
Stores Nationwide, Arrest 21 People in Biggest Crackdown of Trump Era, NBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 
2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/immigration-agents-raid-7-eleven-stores-nation 
wide-arrest-21-people-n836531. 
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southeastern-provision-owner-agrees-to-plead-guilty-to-charges-after-ice-raid/51-585057981. 
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morning-mix/wp/2018/06/06/utter-chaos-ice-arrests-114-workers-in-immigration-raid-at-ohio-
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actions have roots in previous administrations.  For example, the August 
2018 Texas raid mentioned at the outset involved a company that the Obama 
administration had audited and fined just four years earlier.38 
Advocates decry these raids for disregarding basic humanitarian 
principles and stoking stress and fear.39  The impacts of deportation can be 
devastating.  For example, news stories convey that children separated from 
their deported parents are part of the collateral damage caused by surprise 
worksite raids.40  The Nebraska raid in August 2018 separated more than four 
dozen children from their parents.41  Scholars have yet to fully document the 
long-term impact of these separations.  Yet, we know that there are material 
and emotional costs of deportation for the children left behind.  Deportations 
can remove primary breadwinners from households, resulting in foreclosures 
and housing instability.42  They can also lead to permanent family 
dissolution,43 depression, and other mental health crises.44  Raids 
undoubtedly have a chilling effect on local community institutions, as seen 
through the lens of diminished school attendance.45  In April 2018, one 
advocate reported that at least 600 students did not show up for school the 
day after the Tennessee meatpacking raid.  As she put it, “this raid–coupled 
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with local law enforcement involvement–will send shockwaves across the 
country.”46 
Worker advocates have also expressed concern about the effects of these 
raids on workplace rights and protections, which rely on workers’ ability to 
voice their grievances.47  Organized labor groups raised this very critique 
after the raid of an Ohio gardening center in June 2018.  An AFL-CIO 
representative stated that “[w]orksite raids do nothing to raise wages and 
standards for working people in Ohio. In fact, they create fear in our 
workplaces and communities, which actually makes us all less safe.”48  
Indeed, prior research confirms that the fear of immigration enforcement 
measures, even when such measures are absent in practice, disincentivizes 
immigrant workers from making claims against their employers.49  
Moreover, Professor Hiroshi Motomura has noted that some employers use 
the threat of immigration enforcement “as an opportunity to solidify their 
power over workers,” and even if employers never call immigration, the 
“constant threat can make workers’ lives precarious – always reminding them 
that they are powerless.”50 
Workplace raids and deportations also impact the labor supply and 
worker precarity.51 Whereas some scholars characterize immigration as a 
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demographic and economic “lifeline” to small town America,52 others 
highlight the shortages left following major immigration enforcement 
actions. For example, a raid of a food processing plant in Arkansas on 
September 12, 2018 resulted in the detention of 30 people, close to three 
quarters of the plant’s workforce.53 However, often missing from these 
characterizations of immigrants “doing the work that American simply won’t 
do” (as advocates often argue)54–is the race to the bottom that negatively 
impacts all workers, in order to maintain low-cost consumer markets that rely 
on cheap labor.55  In other words, while immigrant labor does indeed fill an 
important gap, the structural conditions that degrade workplace conditions 
ultimately disadvantage all workers. 
In sum, based on the available data on worksite enforcement and a 
survey of news reports, it seems clear that a fixture of Trump’s agenda in the 
coming years will include worksite raids followed by large-scale arrests.  
Lessons from the past remind us of the devastating impact of worker round-
ups.  Such was the case at the end of the Bracero Program, a bilateral 
agreement with Mexico to send Mexican agricultural laborers to the U.S. 
temporarily, when the U.S. deported thousands of workers.56  More recently, 
the small town of Postville, Iowa is still feeling the deleterious effects of the 
workplace raid and mass deportation of 400 meat-packing workers, ten years 
later.57  These actions negatively affect not only workplace justice, but also 
families and communities for generations. 
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B. Employer Audits 
President Trump’s new brand of workplace-based enforcement 
combines worker arrests with intensified compliance measures for 
employers.  As Figure 1 portrays, these initiatives arguably amplify the 
pressure on employers beyond that of the Obama years.  As previously 
mentioned, the Obama administration reduced workplace raids and worksite 
arrests.  Yet, in turn, it increased the number of bureaucratic immigration 
audits and sanctions on employers.  Immigration audits, unlike Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) audits, scrutinize employers hiring documentation to 
ensure that employers have hired individuals with legal authorization to work 
in the United States.  Janet Napolitano, Obama’s Department of Homeland 
Security Secretary, critiqued Bush-era workplace raids. She proclaimed that 
“while federal immigration authorities expended considerable time and 
resources to conduct large-scale workplace immigration raids during the 
Bush administration, too many lawbreaking employers were left 
unpunished.”58 
The Trump administration expresses its intent to go well beyond the 
Obama administration in its efforts to ensure employer compliance with 
1980s’ employer sanctions and verification requirements.  The number of 
ICE audits rose dramatically, from 1,360 in 2017 to 5,981 in 2018.59  News 
reports speculate that this quadrupling of audits is likely to create 
administrative backlogs, as the government does not have sufficient 
personnel (including judges and enforcement police), nor facilities to hold so 
many detainees.  The possible impact for targeted employers is “months or 
years of uncertainty as the potential high cost of fines hangs over their 
heads.”60  ICE is in the process of hiring 60 additional auditors, to add to the 
120 that are currently conducting worksite audits.61  Yet, these will no doubt 
take time to train and start. 
ICE’s rhetoric, and its increase in workplace audits, signal that the 
Trump administration wants to pressure employers even more than before.  
A goal of this effort, in part, is to increase participation in the voluntary 
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compliance program, ICE’s Mutual Agreement between Government and 
Employers (IMAGE).62  In September 2017, ICE directed employers to the 
little-utilized IMAGE program after announcing the landmark $95 million 
settlement with Asplundh Tree services.63  The IMAGE program creates 
incentives for employers’ voluntary participation, in part by reducing 
employer participants’ exposure to fines and penalties.   
ICE’s recent increase in enforcement activity targeting employers is 
notable.  In fiscal year 2018, ICE opened 6,848 new worksite investigations, 
as compared to 1,691 in 2017.64  An ICE official recently described the goal 
of this increase as follows: “business owners [should] fear an ICE 
immigration audit as much as they fear an IRS tax audit.”65  This will require 
more ICE enforcement activity, as the IRS audited close to 19,000 businesses 
in fiscal year 2017 (compared to 5,981 ICE audits that same year).66  Even 
though ICE has not reached IRS audit levels, its rhetoric and recent spike in 
audits is leaving an impression on some employers.  An attorney representing 
businesses confirmed that employers who hire immigrant workers are feeling 
the heat.67  He described ICE’s efforts to date as an “explosion of I-9 
inspections.”68 The implication of this, of course, is that employers will 
comply if they assess that enforcement measures are likely to reach their 
workplace. 
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Even with the influx of audits, it remains unclear how much money the 
Trump administration will ultimately collect from businesses in 
administrative fines after the audits are complete, compared to prior 
administrations.  In Bush’s eight years (2001-2008), the government 
collected an average of about $500,000 a year in administrative fines.69  
During the Obama presidency (2009-2016), that average number jumped to 
$11.5 million per year.70  The first partial year of the Trump presidency 
yielded $7.8 million from employers, but we do not yet have comparable 
numbers for 2018.71  Given the numbers of audits currently underway, as 
observed in Figure 1, it appears that the total amount of administrative fines 
collected will surpass Obama-era levels. 
These measures, or even the heightened rhetorical threat of these 
measures, are likely to shape employer behavior moving forward.  Prior 
research suggests that employers are risk-averse regarding compliance 
measures, which could encourage them to discriminate based on national 
origin and/or race in their employment decisions.72  The heightened rhetoric 
and enforcement actions may make risk averse employers more hesitant to 
hire people with “foreign sounding” names.  They may make them more 
hesitant to employ immigrants who are temporarily authorized to live and 
work in the U.S.73  This was indeed a primary concern of the 1986 federal 
employer sanctions policies, which resulted in the creation of the Office of 
the Special Counsel under the Department of Justice.74 Some employers may 
not want to deal with the hassle and risks involved with hiring workers who 
appear to be immigrants.  Employer risk aversion may in turn create 
significant spillover effects.  For instance, authorized immigrant workers, 
and those who may soon see their work authorization revoked, could be 
harmed.  Given that we are in new immigration policy territory in the Trump 
era–typified by the combined intensification of pressure on workers and 
employers–future research must investigate not only the effects on 
unauthorized workers, but also the effects on employers and workers who are 
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authorized but may “look foreign.”75  In the next Part, we share the 
experiences of a group of low-wage authorized workers who may soon 
become unauthorized. 
III. ‘UN-AUTHORIZING’ WORKERS WITH TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS 
(TPS) 
It’s like you live in a carton of milk . . . you have an expiration date . . .  
 
–Labor Union Advocate for Temporary Immigrant Workers,  
NY NY, September 201876 
 
In this Part, we draw on interviews with temporary worker advocates to 
emphasize that immigration enforcement impacts more than just the 
precarious, unauthorized workforce.  To be sure, the immigration policy 
changes underfoot since Trump took office go far beyond an intensification 
of immigration enforcement targeting the unauthorized workforce.  These 
changes are unprecedented in that they also include a dismantling of 
deportation relief policies that will in effect illegalize/un-authorize thousands 
of immigrants who are currently authorized to live and work in the country.77  
It is important, therefore, to consider the experiences of currently authorized 
workers who are in danger of becoming unauthorized.  The current context 
makes clear that the potential of workplace-based immigration enforcement, 
although specifically targeted at currently unauthorized immigrants, also 
affects many currently authorized immigrant workers as well.78  These 
include, for example, individuals with Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals status who may be unable to renew their two-year permit if the 
program is canceled, or other immigrants such as those with Deferred 
Enforced Departure who have benefitted from routine prosecutorial 
discretion that could be revoked.79 
We specifically consider Trump’s efforts as they affect workers with 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS).  This is a strategic group to study because 
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homesec/RS20844.pdf. 
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the future of this program–and the work authorization it provides–is currently 
in the crosshairs of the Trump administration.  TPS is a humanitarian measure 
intended to provide temporary residency and employment authorization for 
individuals from countries that have experienced natural disasters, wars and 
other events raising humanitarian concerns. TPS holders include 400,000 
workers across the country, but it shares many of the characteristics of other 
groups that have temporary deportation relief, but no path to legal permanent 
residence and naturalized citizenship (such as beneficiaries of Advanced 
Parole and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals/DACA program).80  
Similar to DACA recipients and recipients of other temporary relief, TPS 
holders are one step away from having their current authorization to live and 
work in the U.S. revoked. TPS holders, like other groups of temporary 
immigrant workers, are a population (of mostly working adults) that is 
subject to changes in both their legal status and the immigration policy 
environment for unauthorized workers.  Cecilia Menjívar’s extensive work 
on TPS holders illustrates that individuals with TPS experience a type of 
“liminal legality” that pervades several key aspects of their lives, including 
work.81 
Workers with temporary protection from deportation are also 
particularly vulnerable because, unlike many unauthorized workers who 
have never been subject to government processing, they have provided the 
government with personal information about their residence and their places 
of employment.82  Unlike the vast majority of unauthorized immigrants 
currently in the U.S., the government has the fingerprints and other biometric 
information of temporarily authorized immigrants on file.83  They are, in this 
way, ostensibly easier for ICE to round up and target in a worksite raid 
because they have been subject to government processing and ongoing 
surveillance through each renewal.  If the DHS Secretary cancels a country’s 
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TPS designation, these workers become unauthorized immediately after the 
termination date.84  The TPS program is currently in considerable flux 
because the DHS has announced the termination of relief for major TPS 
countries, such as El Salvador and Haiti.85  However, as of this writing, two 
federal district courts have temporarily halted this termination of status.86 
Interviews with New York City advocates working with TPS recipients 
provide an enlightening perspective on how Trump’s immigration policies 
might affect the employment experiences of those with temporary work 
authorization that the government may soon revoke.  These advocates 
relayed the immense fear held by many TPS holders that they will be picked 
up at work, or on the street, once they become unauthorized.87  They also 
relayed workers’ reluctance to turn to government entities, even those that 
could ostensibly help them, their co-workers, their families, or their 
community.88 
A. Workers’ Fears of Worksite Enforcement and Deportation 
Our interviews confirm that even currently authorized TPS holders are 
fearful of worksite enforcement and deportation measures.  Our team asked 
more than a dozen advocates what they thought were the biggest challenges 
for TPS holders, and how they were reacting to the Trump administration.  In 
every interview, advocates consistently described the current climate as 
stoking “a lot of fear.”89  President Trump’s much-publicized restrictionist 
immigration policies, like the so-called travel ban, sent a lot of immigrants 
into a panic.  One advocate described that after the government announced 
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the first travel ban “everything went haywire.”90  He noted that not only TPS 
holders were fearful. Fear also pervaded the concerns of naturalized 
citizens.91  These responses echo what we know about the spillover effects of 
immigration enforcement on mixed status families, and the broader 
communities in which unauthorized and liminal status individuals have been 
intertwined for decades.92 
The Trump administration’s announcements to cancel TPS status for 
Haitians and Central Americans and other crackdowns of immigrants in 
workplaces and community spaces, stoked widespread concern in these 
communities.  As mentioned, two temporary court injunctions are currently 
holding up these TPS terminations, but workers are in perpetual limbo and 
are wondering, “when will they take it from us?”93  TPS holders, most of 
whom were previously unauthorized, know that if they lose their current 
immigration status they will immediately become unauthorized and 
deportable. 
TPS advocates also told us that most TPS holders are acutely aware that 
immigration enforcement officials can easily locate them and their family 
members.  The very process of obtaining TPS means that these immigrants 
have provided significant identifying information to the government.  This 
information, by design, is updated every 6-18 months, when they must renew 
their TPS designation.  Consequently, these TPS holders logically expressed 
fear that the very information they provided to the government to receive 
humanitarian TPS relief, and to gain work authorization, will be in turn used 
to round them up and deport them. There is no reason to believe that this 
could not, and would not, happen.  One advocate summarized this common 
Trump-era sentiment as such: 
So, TPS filers have consistently given their addresses, their work addresses, 
information about their children, you know, consistently for over, about 
seven years now. And [they wonder,] will that information be used against 
them to possibly deport them? So, a lot of my clients have actually asked 
me, should I be putting this honest information in my applications? And 
will they be coming to my workplace or my last known address to actually 
deport me . . . if [TPS] doesn’t get renewed?94 
In light of growing enforcement efforts, TPS holders were also anxious 
when carrying out everyday life activities.  Advocates reported how TPS 
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holders fear that they will be “snatched up off the streets” of Brooklyn New 
York any day now by ICE.  TPS recipients lay low at work and stay out of 
public spaces; they try not to rock any boats.95  They fear that once they 
become unauthorized they will leave their children without care and they will 
lose their jobs, their homes, their cars, and their ability to feed and care for 
their families locally, and in their origin country.96  One advocate conveyed 
that, 
TPS recipients tell me that every morning before they leave their house they 
have a conversation with their children about what to do if [they] don’t 
come home from work. Every day. They have like their emergency contact, 
what you do, what you don’t do, in case I don’t come home . . . So we’re 
looking at a lot of emotional scarring behind this TPS as well as the 
financial issues that come behind it.97 
The threat of deportation causes immigrants’ fear and stress, and also 
disrupts family relationships,98 erodes health outcomes,99 and creates barriers 
to claims-making.100  Some nefarious employers may take advantage of this 
heightened vulnerability, stoking even more fear.  For instance, recent 
reporting on low-wage guest workers, who are tied to one employer through 
their employment contracts, suggests that employers are increasingly 
leveraging the fear of immigration enforcement to exploit authorized 
workers.101  Indeed, worker advocates refer to Trump’s immigration policies 
as “the nasty boss’s best friend.”102  David Weil, Administrator of the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division under President Obama, 
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commented that due to Trump’s immigration policies “more workers are 
putting up with unpaid wages, untreated injuries and various forms of mental 
and physical abuse.”103  It appears that an increase in retaliatory immigration 
threats is even occurring in more immigrant friendly policy environments 
such as California, where an employer threatened to “use President Donald 
Trump” to deport a worker who asked for back wages.104  Another employer 
reportedly threatened a worker for filing a claim, angrily texting that 
“TRUMP IS COMING TO TOWN” to have the worker deported.105  Data 
from California’s Labor Commissioner show that between January 2017 and 
December 2018 there were 172 worker complaints that employers threatened 
to retaliate against them based on immigration status.106  This is a modest 
number but a notable uptick compared to the mere 29 complaints that same 
office received between 2014 and 2016.107 The rate is likely higher amongst 
those who do not ultimately lodge a formal complaint.  As we will take up 
next, our interviews with advocates suggest that efforts to un-authorize TPS 
holders intensify worker reluctance to interact with even “benevolent arms 
of” the government. 
B. Workers’ Reluctance to Interact with Government 
The current environment challenges workers’ rights enforcement, and 
other forms of government relief, for authorized workers.  Advocates we 
spoke with conveyed that TPS holders are hesitant to interact with all types 
of government workers, including social workers, law enforcement and 
health care officials, all of whom were seen as threats for deportation.108  This 
type of fear means that workers are not getting the help they need when they 
need it, and are not exposing the injustices that they face (in the workplace 
and beyond).  A New York City based government lawyer spoke, for 
example, about how TPS holders are more hesitant than before to reach out 
to government for assistance. She recounted: 
[W]e used to see people come from the immigrant community, now we 
don’t really see as much people coming out and asking for help because of 
fact that they feel that, okay, this is part of some maybe trick or trap.109 
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She contrasted the current situation, from what she had seen in the past, 
and expressed concern that people “are not talking anymore” to government 
resources even when they are desperate for help.110  She fears that individuals 
will turn to unregulated and dangerous forms of the underground economy, 
stating that “people are going to be going the wrong path to get 
information . . . to acquire certain things . . . because [they’re] not trustful of 
government.”111  It means, in her view, that essential laws that protect the 
public will go unenforced. 
Given growing views that government employees are increasingly 
engaging in “tricks or traps” to ensnare immigrants, workers are now more 
unlikely to invoke protections when they face problems in the workplace.  
This reluctance to come forward to voice grievances is particularly 
concerning considering the key role worker claims play in labor and 
employment law enforcement efforts.112  In the eyes of the workers, the 
interviewee said, it is very risky in the current environment to “put 
themselves out there to be exposed,” even to a benevolent arm of the rights 
enforcement bureaucracy.113  Another advocate similarly told us that his 
clients are “very afraid of applying for any type of government provision” 
because they fear it will be used against them in the future.114  These are 
legitimate concerns, given current changes in public charge policies, and 
Trump’s announcement that public benefits use will have immigration 
consequences.115  The result is that TPS individuals on whose behalf she 
advocated were not taking good care of themselves at work or at home.  As 
she put it, “you’re not looking out for yourself” and instead you “are going 
underground.”116 
The impact of this extreme self-censoring is problematic for immigrants’ 
ability to seek the services and assistance they need and deserve.  In fact, 
encouraging immigrants to turn to government is a primary goal of a number 
of immigration relief mechanisms, such as the U and T visas.117  The 
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government intended these mechanisms to grant immigration protections to 
victims of crimes (such as victims of domestic violence) who can be 
encouraged to come forward, and to those who serve as witnesses and help 
law enforcement agencies to enforce the law to advance public safety and 
welfare.118  Many advocates argue that discouraging immigrant participation 
with government entities allows perpetrators–be it an abusive spouse or an 
employer operating with impunity–to evade enforcement.119  Recent changes 
to protective policies for victims of abuse raise the stakes for this engagement 
even further. 
Aggressive immigration enforcement effectively discourages 
immigrants from accessing the rights and services to which they are entitled.  
In light of these findings, future research should consider not only the 
negative effects of immigration policies on the already vulnerable 
unauthorized population, but how the legally liminal status of “soon to be 
unauthorized” populations interacts with other regulatory regimes, such as 
labor and employment rights enforcement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Trump administration’s agenda is both old and new, raising pressing 
questions about its short and long-term impacts on all immigrants, but 
especially those that are in the administration’s crosshairs.  It continues 
trends we have seen before, building on workplace-based immigration 
enforcement tools perfected in past administrations.  Immigrant and worker 
advocates are right to be troubled by the direction in which we are headed.  
It is critical, nonetheless, to understand that these paths have roots in previous 
administrations and have been traversed before to some extent.  As such, 
advocates have built tools in years prior to help mitigate these deleterious 
effects.  For example, advocates have used legal challenges to social security 
no-match letters, collective bargaining agreements that limit employer 
involvement with immigration enforcement, and know-your-rights trainings 
to limit ICE’s power; each may continue to be important today.120 
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The current era is unique, however, in that Trump combines workplace-
based immigration enforcement approaches perfected by Obama and Bush 
before him, though in a new way and with a racist and xenophobic rhetoric 
that has mobilized anti-immigrant forces.  Talk aside, the Trump 
administration targets immigrants for arrest at their workplaces and pressures 
employers to comply through mandatory and voluntary audits.  It is a new 
environment for workers and employers, though with some important 
antecedents.   
As such, it implores us to develop research agendas with an 
immployment law lens.  What effects will this combined pressure have on 
unauthorized workers’ willingness to confront their employers when they 
face injustices in the workplace?  How does it affect immigrant workers’ 
ability to speak with a collective voice on workplace issues?  Does ICE’s 
pressure on employers mitigate employers’ nefarious use of immigration 
enforcement threats to quash unauthorized workers’ collective activity and 
worker mobilization?  It would seem that it could, as evidenced by reports 
from legal advocates who report a spike in employer retaliation claims.121  
Will the intense enforcement environment stoke employers’ fear of hiring 
immigrant workforces, leading to enhanced national origin and race 
discrimination against authorized workers?  This also seems likely.  Will 
Trump’s combination of pressure on workers and employers lead to reduced 
flows of unauthorized immigration, the policy’s stated goal?  Given what the 
sociological literature tells us about the way home country conditions push 
migrants out and social networks pull migrants in, it seems likely that it will 
not.122  If anything, the unauthorized migrant flow is most responsive to 
economic shifts, having dropped some since the last Great Recession.123 
The current regime is also distinctive in that it aims to un-authorize 
broad swaths of the population who were previously granted protection from 
deportation.124  This is indeed a new hallmark of Trump’s policies.  Unlike 
prior administrations, the Trump administration undeniably aims to turn large 
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groups of authorized workers (e.g. TPS, DED, DACAmented) into 
unauthorized workers by the end of his presidency. This anti-immigrant 
campaign has targeted noncitizens in particular but has also included efforts 
to denaturalize U.S. citizens.125  The potential un-authorization of authorized 
immigrants reminds us that future research should focus not only on the 
currently unauthorized immigrant population. Indeed, as mentioned, 
intensified pressure on employers may negatively affect other workers. Risk 
averse employers may respond by shying away from hiring immigrants in 
general, even those who are authorized to work.  When employers hire 
authorized immigrant workers, will they use “the ICE Crackdown” as a 
“weapon[]” to further deteriorate working conditions for low-wage workers, 
as has been reported in the guest worker context?126 
Future research should consider the important role that employers play 
within the immigration enforcement regime.  Employers are both targets of 
immigration enforcement efforts, which lead to compliance concerns, and 
vehicles for immigration enforcement against unauthorized workers.  The 
latter gives employers enhanced power over their workforces.  Future studies 
should also consider how immigration enforcement may alter the 
calculations of soon-to-be unauthorized workers, like TPS holders.  Given 
their registration with immigration enforcement authorities, are these 
authorized workers more disincentivized than their unauthorized peers to 
engage in collective activity and raise claims because they are more easily 
deportable?  Does this further hinder their willingness to make legal claims 
and organize?  Or, are they comparatively more empowered than they were 
in the past because they now have less to lose? 
We call for thorough analysis not only of immigration enforcement’s 
effects on workers and employers, but also its effects on other government 
compliance and social welfare regimes. When rights and benefits are made 
available to all residents regardless of immigration status, enforcement 
authorities and other service providers must be able to carry out their 
missions and reach their communities in need.  Yet, it is unclear how 
immigration policies will impact police officers’ ability to protect victims of 
domestic violence, hospitals’ ability to offer health care covered by universal 
benefits, schools’ ability to provide a free and equal education to the children 
of immigrants, or workers’ ability to experience the health and wage 
protections that have been put in place.  Can non-immigration related arms 
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of the state remain independent and avoid getting involved in immigration 
enforcement efforts? 
In sum, future research should consider how immigration law, and 
immigration law enforcement measures, impact workers’ employment 
experiences and employer behavior.  Along with interrogating the 
experiences of unauthorized workers in the Trump era, we must examine the 
experiences of currently authorized workers across a variety of liminal 
immigration statuses.  Researchers and policymakers should consider not 
only how government actions encourage immigration law compliance, but 
also how those same actions may negatively impact worker wellbeing and 
other areas of government regulation. 
 
